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John T. Noonan, Jr.*
Commentary
The Root and Branch of
Roe v. Wade
By root I mean the jurisprudential source, by branch I mean the
ultimate outcropping of the famous abortion rights case, Roe v.
Wade.' The root is of greater importance than the issue is. It
reaches to every constitutional right and liberty. The branch illus-
trates what is possible once the law severs correspondence with
reality.
Whoever has the power to define the bearer of constitutional
rights has a power that can make nonsense of any particular con-
stitutional right. That this power belongs to the state itself is a
point of view associated in jurisprudence with Hans Kelsen. Ac-
cording to Kelsen a person is simply a construct of the law. As he
expresses it in The Pure Theory of Law, even the apparently natu-
ral physical person is a construction of juristic thinking. In this
account it appears that just as we personify a corporation for legal
purposes so we personify natural physical beings. There are no
independent, ontological existences to which we respond as per-
sons. Personhood depends on recognition by the law.2
A corollary of that position appears to be what has always
seemed to me one of the most terrifying of legal propositions:
there is no kind of human behavior that, because of its nature,
could not be made into a legal duty corresponding to a legal right.
When one thinks of the vast variety of human behavior it is at least
startling to think that every variation could be converted into legal
duties and legal rights. The proposition becomes terrifying when
one thinks of Orwell's 1984 or the actual conduct of the Nazi regime
from which Hans Kelsen himself eventually had to flee.3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 95 (M. Knight trans. 2nd ed. 1967).
3. Id. at 113. Kelsen was far from being a monster. Indeed, as the author came
to know from experience in Berkeley in the 1960's, he was the most gracious
of hosts. Attacks on his methodology for so ruthlessly emptying law of all
values are not attacks on the human being whose own values were hostile to
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There is one massive phenomenon in the history of our country
that might be invoked to support Kelsen's point of view. That phe-
nomenon is the way a very large class of human beings were
treated prior to the enactment of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments. When one looks back at the history of 200 years of
slavery in the United States, and looks back at it as a lawyer ob-
serving that lawyers had a great deal to do with the classifications
that made the phenomenon possible, one realizes that the law, in
fact, has been used to create legal rights and legal duties in rela-
tion to human behavior that should never have been given a legal
form and a legal blessing. To put it bluntly, law was the medium
and lawyers were the agents responsible for turning one class of
human beings into property. The result was that the property laws
of the different states made it smooth and easy to transfer owner-
ship of these human beings. The property laws resolved the ques-
tions that occurred at those critical junctions where humanity
asserted itself either in the birth of a child to a slave or the death of
the owner of a slave. The only question left open for argument was
whether the human beings classified as property were realty or
personality. In the inheritance cases the slave child was treated
like the issue of an animal, compared again and again in legal deci-
sions to the issue of livestock.
4
Gross characterization of human beings in terms that reduced
them to animals, or real estate, or even kitchen utensils now may
seem so unbelievable that we all can profess shock and amaze-
ment that it was ever done. Eminently respectable lawyers were
able to engage in this kind of characterization-among them
Thomas Jefferson, who co-authored the slave code of Virginia, and
Abraham Lincoln who argued on behalf of a slave owner seeking to
recover as his property a woman and her four children who had
escaped to the free state of Illinois.5 Looking at such familiar ex-
amples and realizing how commonplace it was for lawyers to en-
gage in this kind of fiction, we learn, I think, that law can operate as
a kind of magic. All that is necessary is to permit legal legerde-
main to create a mask obliterating the human person being dealt
with. Looking at the mask-that is looking at the abstract category
created by the law-is not to see the human reality on which the
mask is imposed.
Masking of this kind even occurred in one case where the per-
Naziism, slavery, and the other dehumanizations that could find jurispruden-
tial shelter in his analysis of law.
4. See, e.g., Hearne v. Roane, 1 Va. Ch. (Wythe) 90 (1790). See generally J. Noo-
NAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 39-43 (1976).
5. See, eg., J. NOONAN, supra note 4, at 50-54 (Jefferson); Chroust, Abraham Lin-
coln Argues a Pro-Slavery Case, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 299, 299-308 (1960).
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sonhood of Blacks was put directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States-The Antelope,6 a case that takes its name from a
ship captured off the coast of Georgia in 1821. Aboard were 281
Africans about to be brought into the United States as slaves. Fed-
eral law made it a felony to import slaves and prescribed that the
President should rescue any Africans found in that condition and
arrange for them to return to Africa. President James Monroe was
about to carry out this law when agents representing Spanish and
Portuguese slave traders claimed in federal district court that the
Africans were Spanish and Portuguese property. They alleged
that their principals were trading peacefully off the coast of Africa
when their property had been captured by pirates who then ille-
gally attempted to bring the property into the United States. This
illegality, they asserted, should not taint their title. Please give us
back our property, they asked.
7
The United States District Attorney in Savannah, Richard
Wylly Habersham, took the position that every one of the rescued
African men and women was just as free as Americans would have
been if they had been washed upon the shore of Algiers or Mo-
rocco and claimed by slave traders there. He put the argument di-
rectly to the district court that these were human beings that were
not to be disposed of as property. The district judge disagreed as
to the majority of persons before him and ordered them turned
over to "their" owners; a small number, found to have come from
an American ship, were freed. On appeal, the circuit court found
the main problem to be how to distinguish between the Africans
from the American ship and the Africans from the Spanish and
Portuguese ships. The court resolved the problem by ordering a
lottery to determine who was free-an eminently sensible solution
if animals or other goods were being disposed of.8
The main issues were put before the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1825. One group of lawyers, led by Francis Scott
Key, pointed to the human reality, arguing that here was flesh and
blood, that these Africans could not be treated like things or di-
posed of by a game of chance. Another group of lawyers, led by
Senator John MacPherson Berrien, argued just as earnestly that
only property was before the Court. The Supreme Court found
that some of the Africans were people and some of the Africans
6. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
7. See generally J. NOONAN, THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED
AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY AD-
AMS (1977).
8. Id. at 44 (Habersham's position); 57-60 (judgment of the district court); 65
(lottery).
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were property.9
Three years later, after a period during which the status of
which African was a person and which African was a thing was
again litigated in the circuit court and the Supreme Court itself,
120 Africans were freed and thirty-seven became the property of
Congressman Richard Henry Wilde of Georgia. Even with the
most obvious kind of evidence before the Court as to the humanity
of the class affected by the law, the justices of the Supreme Court
had been capable of applying one category of law to one set of per-
sons that left them free and another category-a mask-to a very
similar group that left them enslaved in perpetuity. 0
A much more familiar case of the same kind is Scott v. San-
ford." Here the black plaintiff attempted to assert his right to
freedom in the federal court. The Supreme Court held that the
federal statute that should have made him free was an interfer-
ence with the property rights guaranteed by the Constitution to his
owner. The Court applied the due process clause of the fifth
amendment-gratuitiously reading into this clause a concept of
substantive due process-and held the statute invalid. The prop-
erty mask dropped over Dred Scott was the means by which the
Constitution was brought into play. As James Buchanan, the Pres-
ident at the time, happily put it, the Court had achieved "the final
settlement" of the question of slavery in the Territories.12 It was a
final settlement curiously like Adolph Hitler's "final solution" of
"the Jewish question" in Germany.
Buchanan's description, of course, was inaccurate. The
Supreme Court could not resolve an issue that so fundamentally
divided the nation. The legal mask was shattered by the Civil War.
The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were adopted. The le-
gal profession forgot about its participation in molding the mask
that made slavery possible. It is only in our time that the analogy
seems vital.
Kelsen's jurisprudence makes The Antelope and Dred Scott de-
fensible decisions: according to it, there is nothing intrinsic in hu-
manity requiring persons to be legally recognized as persons. The
relevance of Kelsen's reasoning was acknowledged in a modern
case, Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospital Corporation,'3
9. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 66 (1825) (arguments and judgment).
10. The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 550 (1827). See also J. NOONAN, supra note
7, at 135 & 151 (noting the number freed and the number enslaved).
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. James Buchanan, Third Annual Message to Congress, 4 PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 3085-86 (J. Richardson ed. 1913).
13. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410
U.S. 940 (1973).
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decided a year before the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade.14
In Byrn, Robert Byrn was appointed guardian ad litem of an un-
born child and asserted that child's constitutional right not to be
aborted. His position was rejected by the majority of the Court of
Appeals of New York, speaking through Judge Charles Breitel.
Breitel quoted Kelsen explicitly to support his position that it was
a policy determination of the state whether legal personality
should be recognized or not. It was, Breitel stated, "not true that
the legal order corresponds to the natural order."' 5 Breitel did not
go as far as Kelsen's statement that natural persons were juristic
creations-Breitel seemed to assume that there might be natural
persons-but he left the recognition of natural persons to the legis-
lature. As New York, at this time, had already enacted a fairly rad-
ical abortion law, he held that the legislature had conclusively
made the decision that left the unborn child outside the class of
recognized humanity.
The dissent, written by Judge Adrian Burke, objected to this
jurisprudence. In Burke's view the reality of a person before the
law was not dependent on a determination by the state. He con-
tended that the state had no constitutional power to classify a
group of living human beings as fit subjects for annihilation.16 He
insisted that if the state could make that kind of classification, it
became the source of all legal rights. He observed that all the pro-
tections of the Constitution meant nothing if you or your group
could be classified by the state so that you fell outside the class of
human beings protected by the Constitution.
Roe v. Wade itself, decided a year later, was profoundly ambiva-
lent-indeed, to speak bluntly, it was schizoid in its approach to
the power of the state to determine who was a person. The opinion
was schizoid because the Court wanted to invoke rights that were
not dependent on the state-the Court was trying to find a meas-
ure by which to invalidate state statutes. The precedents that the
Court found to authorize it to act in this area of law were all cases
that treated family rights as having a natural basis superior to the
law of the state. The cases involved included Meyer v. Nebraska'7
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,18 recognizing a superior right of
parents to educate their children; Skinner v. Oklahoma,19 recogniz-
ing that a man has a natural right to procreate and so cannot be
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1977).
15. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 202,286 N.E.2d 887,
889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (1970).
16. Id. at 209, 286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 399 (Burke, J., dissenting).
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
18. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19. 315 U.S. 535 (1942).
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arbitrarily sterilized by the state; Loving v. Virginia,20 where the
natural right to marry was invoked in the course of invalidating a
miscengenation statute; and Griswold v. Connecticut,2 1 where the
rights of the married were also asserted, in this case to hold uncon-
stitutional a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives.
All of these cases rested on the supposition that the family
rights being protected were those of persons, and that these per-
sons could not be unmade at will by the state. The natural law
fundament of these decisions was camouflaged by their being
couched in constitutional language; but the constitutional content
was derived from nowhere except the natural law as it had taken
shape in the traditions of the United States. At the same time that
it invoked such precedents in Roe, the Court, when treating of the
unborn, felt free to impose its own notions of reality.
In one passage the Court spoke of the unborn before viability as
"a theory of life,"22 as though there were competing views as to
whether life in fact existed before viability. The implication could
also be found that there was no reality there in the womb but
merely theories about what was there. The Court seemed to be
uncertain itself and to take the position that if it were unsure, no-
body else could be sure. In another passage the Court spoke of life
in the womb up to birth as "potential life."2 3 This description was
accurate if it meant there was existing life with a great deal of de-
velopment yet to come, as one might say a 5-year-old is "potential
life" meaning that he or she is only potentially what he or she will
be at twenty-five. The Court's description was inaccurate if the
Court meant to suggest that what was in the womb was pure po-
tentiality, a zero that could not be protected by law. To judge from
the weight the Court gave the being in the womb-found to be pro-
tectable in any degree only in the last two months of pregnancy-
the Court itself must have viewed the unborn as pure potentiality
or a mere theory before viability. The Court's opinion appeared to
rest on the assumption that the biological reality could be
subordinated or ignored by the sovereign speaking through the
Court.
The conflict, visible in Roe v. Wade between a natural law re-
sponse to human reality and a Kelsenite freedom in recognizing
human reality, was resolved in the Kelsenite direction in the cases
that followed. In Doe v. Israel24 the federal courts considered a
20. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
23. Id. at 163.
24. 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.IL), afd 482 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1974).
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statute recognizing the personhood of the unborn child in Rhode
Island. The American Civil Liberties Union attacked the statute
and persuaded the federal courts to hold it invalid. The courts ac-
tually took the position that Rhode Island's statute was frivolous,
that a single federal judge could hold the statute invalid, and that
the judge need not even hear the biological evidence supporting
the statute. The Supreme Court had determined who was the
bearer of rights. A federal judge now did not have to look at the
physical realities. Evidence that the unborn were not zeros was
not to be permitted.
Similarly, in Floyd v. Anders25 a small black boy had been
aborted, but had survived abortion and had lived for twenty days
before dying, apparently as a result of what he had suffered during
the abortion. The state of South Carolina, adopting the common
law that if a child survives an abortion but dies of the wounds, the
offense is murder, prosecuted the doctor who had performed the
abortion. The doctor sought to have the federal court enjoin the
prosecution. Granting the injunction, Judge Clement Haynsworth
observed that the Supreme Court had determined that the fetus in
the womb is "not alive."26 This was a remarkable statement for a
senior federal judge to make, as though whether one was alive or
dead could be conclusively determined for a whole class of human
beings by a ruling of the Supreme Court. Judge Haynsworth's
view, one might say, exaggerated a bit, but his opinion is a reading
of what Roe v. Wade meant to a responsible federal judge. The
implication of his reading was that the Supreme Court was the ul-
timate arbiter of life and death in the very fundamental sense of
being able to say who was alive to assert rights.
In Danforth v. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri,2 7 the
Supreme Court itself opted clearly for the Kelsenite position. A
Missouri statute had given fathers a part in the abortion decision.
The Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. Speaking
for the Court, Justice Blackmun reasoned that it had already been
determined that the state had no power to intervene in the abor-
tion decision. Therefore, he concluded, the state had no power
that it could delegate to fathers. His assumption was that the state
was the only source of rights. That a father might have rights in-
dependent of delegation from a state was not treated as worthy of
consideration or mention.28
If the rationale of Danforth had prevailed in the earlier parental
right cases they would have been decided very differently. If the
25. 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 445 (1979).
26. Id. at 539.
27. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
28. Id. at 67-72.
[Vol. 63:668
ROOT AND BRANCH
state is the source of all parental rights, then the state must be
able to curtail those rights and to take away its delegation of them.
A state could refuse to delegate its right to education to the par-
ents. Only by recognizing rights superior to the state did the natu-
ral law precedents invoked by Roe v. Wade have intelligibility.
The progeny of Roe have confirmed the Kelsenite reading of
Roe that there is no reality that the sovereign must recognize un-
less the sovereign, acting through the agency of the Court, decides
to recognize it. This view would be psychologically incomprehen-
sible if we did not have the history of the creation of the institution
of slavery by judges and lawyers. With that history we can see
that intelligent and humane lawyers have been able to apply a sim-
ilar approach to a whole class of beings that they could see-that
they were able to create a mask of legal concepts preventing hu-
manity from being visible. A mask is a little easier to impose when
the humanity concealed, being in the womb, is not even visible to
the naked eye.2
9
Kelsenite logic permits the judges at the apex of a system to
dispense with correspondence to reality. The highest court is then
free, within the limits that the society in which it functions will
tolerate, to be inventive. It may, as the Supreme Court of the
United States has sometimes thought, be constrained by the lan-
guage of the Constitution and the purposes of its makers. Or, as
has also sometimes happened, the Court, viewing itself as the final
expounder of the Constitution's meaning, will exercise its inven-
tiveness in creating new constitutional doctrine not dependent on
text or purposes. Such doctrine-fantasy in the service of ideol-
ogy-is "the branch" of Roe v. Wade. What then becomes possible
was illustrated in 1983 by Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health.30 In this case a whole set of constitutional requirements
were created on behalf of the claims of an abortion clinic, named
with Orwellian aptness, a center for "reproductive health."
In Akron the only justification that Justice Powell, writing for
the Court, gave for the main holdings was stare decisis-Roe v.
Wade would not be reexamined. He acknowledged that stare deci-
sis was "perhaps never entirely persuasive on constitutional ques-
tions."31 In fact, stare decisis has "often" been rejected by the
Court, reversing itself and discarding its own interpretation of the
Constitution as mistaken. Still, Justice Powell made the case
swing on the precedent, declaring roundly that stare decisis "is a
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the rule of
29. See J. NOONAN, A PRVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
153-62 (1979).
30. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
31. Id. at 2487.
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law. We respect it today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade." 32
Curiously enough, however, in the course of Akron the Court
itself discarded one constitutional precedent. In Gary Northwest
Indiana Women's Service, Inc. v. Orr33 the Court had specifically
upheld a law requiring hospitalization for abortions performed in
the second trimester. In Akron this precedent was silently set
aside and it was not stated to be unconstitutional to require such
hospitalization.34
The reason the Court gave for not following precedent on this
constitutional point was that current medical statistics showed
that second trimester abortions were not unreasonably dangerous
to the women undergoing them. The statistics employed had been
published after the trial court had heard the case. The implication
of the opinion was that, in order to conform to constitutional re-
quirements, any statute governing abortion would have to adjust
constitutionally to the latest medical information.3 5
Looked at from one aspect this approach can be seen as ulti-
mately subversive of Roe v. Wade itself. This approach called the
Court back to a consideration of realities not controlled by judicial
fiat. In a famous dissent, Justice Brandeis, arguing for overruling a
line of bad constitutional precedents, declared that the Court
should bring itself "into agreement with experience and with facts
newly ascertained, so that its judicial authority may, as Mr. Chief
Justice Taney said, 'depend altogether on the force of the reason-
ing by which it is supported.' "36 The roots of Roe are severed if
the Court is willing to bring itself into agreement with experience
and have its authority depend on the force of its reasoning.
In Akron, however, the Court, in general, held to the basic logic
of Roe and discovered new dimensions of the Constitutional pro-
tection for abortion. The Akron ordinance required a person seek-
ing an abortion to wait for twenty-four hours. Twenty-four hours
was found to be too long. Justice Powell called it "arbitrary and
inflexible."3 7 The requirement violated the Constitution.
In the so called "Abortion Funding Cases," Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the Court, had said the state had a traditional and judi-
cially-recognizable interest in encouraging childbirth.38 The
32. Id.
33. 451 U.S. 931 (1981), affg 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
34. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2497
(1983).
35. Id. at 2496.
36. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849)).
37. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2503
(1983).
38. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977).
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state's interest shrivelled to almost nothing when a mere twenty-
four hour waiting period was too great a burden on the person
seeking an abortion. Beyond any constitutional theory and be-
yond any jurisprudential considerations, the holding of Akron ap-
peared to reflect a good deal of impatience with anything in the
way of the victory of an ideology. Impatience was satisfied by con-
stitutional inventiveness, unrestrained by the text or the purposes
of the Constitution.
A further holding of Akron was that the city could not require
that a physician give counselling to the abortion seeker; the most
the law could require was that some "qualified" delegate of the
doctor provide counselling.3 9 It was extraordinary that the Consti-
tution could be found to speak so precisely as to what psychologi-
cal advice could or could not be made available. The holding was
also interestingly inconsistent with the general implication of Roe
v. Wade as to the importance of the family physician.40 In Roe the
physician was treated as an heroic figure, one on whom the abor-
tion seeker could depend; but when an attempt was made to build
upon this deference to the doctor in a way that the Court found
restrictive of the abortion liberty, the Court's deference was swal-
lowed up by its desire to extend the liberty as widely as possible.
Most strikingly of all, Akron held that there could not be a legal
requirement that a women seeking an abortion be informed that
the being she wished put to death was a child, that the child was
alive, and that the child was human. The Court treated this infor-
mation as prejudicing the choice of whether to abort or not-as a
kind of unfair interference with free choice. The ordinance was
bad because it was designed "to influence the woman's informed
choice between abortion and childbirth."41 The holding went be-
yond the Kelsenite jurisprudential root and any mainline theory of
constitutional interpretation. It was, indeed, the invention of a
kind of censorship by the Court itself.
The logic of Akron in this respect, if taken just a little further, is
that a state university or a city high school should not be permitted
to teach biology. The facts that would have been provided to a wo-
man under the Akron ordinance are the same kind of facts that
would be provided in a modern course in biology. Such a course
39. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2502
(1983).
40. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973).
41. AKRON, OMo, CODIFIED ORDINANCES No. 160-1978, § 1870.06 (1978), quoted in
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198,
1206 n.5 (6th Cir. 1981). Justice Powell in his opinion for the Court does not
mention the specific information about the child's humanity, but holds the
whole section invalid. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2499-2500 (1983).
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would inform its students of the unique chromosomal composition
of the child that distinguishes the child as male or female and as
animal or human. If student's looking at a genetic sample under
the microscope could not recognize the number, the shape, and the
bonding patterns of the chromosomes-if they could not say
whether the genetic specimen came from a simian being or from a
human being-they would fail the course. Information enabling
them to answer correctly might also "influence" their choice of
abortion or childbirth.
A final provision of the Akron ordinance was that "the remains
of the unborn child" be "disposed in a humane and sanitary man-
ner."42 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the word "hu-
mane" impermissibly vague in a criminal statute.43 The ordinance
could, the court said, mean to "mandate some sort of 'decent bur-
ial' of an embryo at the earliest stages of formation ... ."44 Jus-
tice Powell quoted this analysis and agreed; humane and sanitary
burial was beyond the comprehension of a reasonable doctor.45
In this conclusion one can observe in the most concrete way the
Court's discomfort before reality. The Court cannot uphold a re-
quirement of humane burial without conceding that the being who
is to be buried is human. A mask has been placed over this being.
Even death cannot remove the mask.
The Court's denial of reality stands in contrast with what Andre
Gide has written on the humane burial of an unborn child:
When morning came, "get rid of that," I said naively to the gardener's wife
when she finally came to see how everything was. Could I have supposed
that those formless fragments, to which I turning away in disgust was
pointing, could I have supposed that in the eyes of the Church they al-
ready represented the sacred human being they were being readied to
clothe? 0 mystery of incarnation! Imagine then my stupor when some
hours later I saw "it" again. The thing which for me already had no name
in any language, now cleaned, adorned, beribboned, laid in a little cradle,
awaiting the ritual entombment. Fortunately no one had been aware of
the sacrilege I had been about to commit; I had already committed it in
thought when I had said get rid of "that." Yes, very happily that ill-consid-
ered order had been heard by no one. And, I remained a long time musing
before "it." Before that little face with the crushed forehead on which
they had carefully hidden the wound. Before this innocent flesh which I, if
I had been alone, yielding to my first impulse, would have consigned to the
manure heap along with the afterbirth and which religious attentions had
just saved from the void. I told no one then of what I felt. Of what I tell
here. Was I to think that for a few moments a soul had inhabited this
42. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES No. 160-1978, § 1870.16 (1978).
43. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1211
(1981).
44. Id.
45. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 2504
(1983).
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body? It has its tomb in Couvreville in that cemetery to which I wish not
to return. Half a century has passed. I cannot truthfully say that I recall
in detail that little face. No. What I remember exactly is my surprise, my
sudden emotion, when confronted by its extraordinary beauty.4 6
If the Court could respond to Gide and understand what hu-
mane and sanitary burial is, it might also perceive the reality of the
extraordinary beauty of each human being put to death in the
name of the abortion liberty and concealed from legal recognition
by a jurisprudence that substitutes a judge's fiat for the truth.
46. A. GuE, LAST JouPNALs 95 (R. Stookey trans. 1979).
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